Abstract: We examine data on waves of currency crises from 1992, 1994, 1997, and 1998 to evaluate several hypotheses on the determinants of contagion. We simultaneously consider trade, financial links, legal and institutional indicators, geographical distance, and standard macroeconomic variables as controls. To overcome data limitations and account for model uncertainty, we utilize Bayesian methodologies hitherto unused in the empirical literature on contagion. In particular, we use the Bayesian averaging of binary models which allows us to take into account the uncertainty regarding the set of regressors.
Introduction
Currency crises tend to occur in waves. In repeated instances from the early 1970s to the late 1990s it has been observed that when speculative attacks lead to a crisis in one country, market volatility tends to spread to other countries in the region and elsewhere. Several authors have examined the possible mechanisms that drive this spread, identifying trade and financial links, changes in risk aversion and "wake-up calls" regarding the sustainability of specific institutions and development models as potential channels by which contagion spreads among countries.
In this paper we empirically evaluate the relative importance of the various potential transmission mechanisms that have been proposed in the existing literature, by analysing four waves of currency crises in the 1990s. We make two contributions. First, we simultaneously include institutional variables alongside the trade, finance and macroeconomic variables commonly analysed in empirical literature on contagious currency crises, thereby directly testing the "wake-up call" hypothesis. Second, we utilize Bayesian methodologies hitherto unused in the empirical literature on contagion to overcome data limitations and model uncertainty. In particular, we use Bayesian averaging of binary models, which allows us to take into account the uncertainty regarding the set of regressors that should be included. This uncertainty inevitably arises from the existence of alternative hypotheses that could potentially explain contagion of currency crises.
At this stage it is also important to note what we do not do in this paper: we do not seek to enter the debate on whether contagion exists.
1 It is impossible to "prove" that waves of currency crises are not caused by some common shock in some unobserved (and possibly unknown) variable or combination of variables. However, it seems unlikely that scattered currency crises can be attributed to global shocks and most market participants agree on the existence of contagion. Micro-theoretic work by Allen and Gale (2000) , Morris (1997) , Goldstein and Pauzner (2004), and Dasgupta (2004) , among others, provide (stylised) structural backing for the existence of contagion in market equilibrium. We therefore assume that contagion exists and aim only to shed light on the mechanisms by which it may occur.
Much of the literature on contagious currency crises stresses the phenomenon of regional contagion. It has therefore focused on trade and financial links, which also occur in geographical clusters. Evidence is found in favour of both trade competition and financial links as potential transmission mechanisms for contagion.
2 However, given the high correlation between variables capturing competition for funds and those measuring trade links and trade competition, the results on the importance of the financial variables are not always robust to the inclusion of trade variables. Our paper provides guidance on which of these channels is in fact the most important one.
Moreover, the currency crises of the 1990s have spread far beyond the region of the original crisis country. Glick and Rose (1999) deem that Hong Kong, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand were affected by the "Mexican crisis" in 1994 / 1995, while Argentina, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Hungary and South Africa are considered to have been among the victims of the Asian Crisis. According to Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) the Russian crisis of 1998 affected 16 countries outside the former Soviet Union, including Argentina, Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey. While trade competition in third markets may be a possible explanation of extraregional contagion, it is also interesting to examine the possibility that a speculative attack on a country follows from a "wake-up call" highlighting vulnerabilities associated with particular institutional features, which are found in other countries outside the region.
Bayesian methods are particularly relevant to the analysis of binary data in the context of contagious currency crises for a number of reasons. First, empirical samples are of necessity small: in all previous studies the number of observations is below 100 countries. Of these only a small subset of which experience a crisis in each episode of contagion. Unlike maximum likelihood, Bayesian methods are also valid in small samples. Moreover, Bayesian Model Averaging allows us to obtain results that are robust to the specification of the regression equation. In particular, we appropriately take into account the uncertainty regarding the set of variables that actually contribute to explain the spread of currency crises. We illustrate the performance of Bayesian and Maximum Likelihood tests of significance with a Monte Carlo experiment.
We examine data on currency crises in 1992, 1994, 1997, and 1998 , focussing on the relative importance of trade, financial links, institutional features, and macroeconomic variables on the direction of contagion. We report the following results:
1. Institutional variables play an important role in all currency crises considered, thus providing persuasive evidence in favour of the "wake up call" hypothesis for financial contagion. We find that "institutional similarity" in terms of the quality of governance increases the likelihood of contagion in years 1994, 1997 and 1998. 2. Trade, distance, legal system, and financial indicators might also play a role in determining the direction of contagion, but their importance depends on the nature of the crisis. The relevance of these variables is also sensitive to the specification of the prior. Our paper is linked to a large and growing literature on financial contagion. In what follows, we briefly survey this literature.
Literature review
The literature has considered a number of potential channels for international financial contagion. 3 The first potential channel derives from international trade. 4 If a country experiences a sharp devaluation it gains a competitive advantage over its trade partners and over competitors in third markets. To the extent that (the expectation of) deteriorating current account deficits signals potential currency weakness, countries with strong trade connections to the "ground zero country" become more likely to experience a speculative attack. Glick and Rose (1999) examine the importance of the trade channel and find statistical evidence from crosscountry data that currency crises spread among countries which have strong trade links. However, trade integration is particularly strong within regions, which also tend to have strong financial linkages, as well as cultural and institutional similarities. It is possible that proxies for trade integration also proxy for these other similarities.
A second potential channel of contagion derives from financial linkages between countries.
5 Here contagion arises because groups of countries rely on common creditors and investors. If a country experiences a speculative attack, its major creditor banks may experience liquidity problems, which undermine their ability to provide emergency finance to other countries or trigger capital outflows to restore capital adequacy ratios. Therefore, countries which rely on external funding from the same creditors and investors as the "ground zero country" become vulnerable to speculative attacks. The importance of the "common creditor effect", meaning contagion through bank lending, has been empirically examined by Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001 and 2003) , Caramazza et al. (1999) , Hernandez and Valdes (2001) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) . The results indicate that vulnerability to speculative attacks can spread among clusters of countries which depend on the same lenders. Caramazza et al. (1999) additionally show that countries which are more important to the common lenders are more likely to become crises countries than those which only receive a very small proportion of the common lenders' total lending. However, a potential source of concern regarding these results is that the clusters of countries which depend on common lenders -e.g. South America on US banks, South East Asia on Japanese banks and Eastern Europe on German and other European banks -also have either strong trade links or are in direct trade competition with each other. It is therefore difficult to disentangle the relative importance of the trade and the financial channel using classical regression methodologies.
A third channel for contagion derives from shared updating by market participants about the sustainability of specific institutional frameworks or development models. Such a view of contagion is commonly referred to as the "wake-up call" hypothesis.
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The argument here is that if a country with a particular development strategy, institutional set-up or macroeconomic situation experiences a devaluation, this may be seen as revealing information about the vulnerability of countries of a similar "type" and hence cause the spread of crises.
7 A good example of a major re-evaluation of an economic development strategy was seen in the rapid turn-around in 1997 from applauding the "Asian Miracle" 8 to deploring the "Asian Debacle". Months before the crisis South East Asia's "dedicated capitalism" 9 and "Asian values" were praised and held up as strategies for successful development the world over, but were swiftly condemned as "crony capitalism" in the immediate aftermath of the crisis and held responsible for economic vulnerabilities. Issues such as "corruption", "regulatory quality" and "transparency" suddenly came to the forefront of investor attention and may have contributed to the spreading of the crisis to countries perceived to have 5 For theoretical models formalizing this hypothesis, see, for example, Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) , Allen and Gale (2000), and Dasgupta (2004) . 6 For a theoretical model formalizing this hypothesis, see Rigobon (1998) . Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003) provide evidence for the "wake-up call" hypothesis from the Russian crisis, which caused generalized outflows from emerging markets. 7 See Drazen (1998) on "information externalities" 8 See for example the 1993 World Bank publication "The South East Asian Miracle" hailing the "fundamentally sound development policies" and "tailored government interventions" in eight high performing Asian economies. 9 Porter (1996) similar deficits in accountability and data quality. While a large literature has emerged in recent years to measure and quantify the effects of legal and institutional variables on financial development 10 and financial fragility 11 to our knowledge no direct test of the impact of institutional similarity on financial contagion has been carried out. It is a contribution of this paper to provide a direct examination of the "wake-up call" hypothesis using measures of institutional similarity provided in the literature.
Data
In Table 1 we summarize the variables that we use. To examine the relative importance of the trade channel we use the "trade share" indicator computed by Glick and Rose for 1992 , 1994 and 1997 and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003 for 1998. A high value of this index indicates that the country's exports compete intensely with the ground zero country in third markets.
For financial variables, we choose two indicators of competition for funds based on Caramazza et al. (1999) . Define the "common lender" to be the creditor country most exposed to the ground zero country. For any given country, our first indicator indexes the importance of the common lender to that country. For the emerging market crises the "common lenders" are the US (1994), Japan (1997) and Germany (1998) . For example, in the Russian crisis of 1998 the indicator looks at the proportion of country i's total borrowing which derived from German banks. Our second indicator measures how important a potential target country is to the common lender. Thus, the indicator measures country i's borrowing as a proportion of the total loans made by the common lender. We also include a multiplicative interaction of these two indicators. The data are taken from the Bank for International Settlements' (BIS) consolidated data, covering bank lending from banking systems in the "reporting area" of 18 industrialised countries to countries outside the "reporting area".
12 All indicators refer to banks' position reported at the date closest to the respective crises i.e. December 1994 for the Mexican crisis, June 1997 for the Asian crisis and June 1998 for the Russian crisis. The BIS data only cover lending from the reporting area to countries outside the reporting area, meaning that no financial data are available for the 1992 crisis in the European exchange rate mechanism. However, it is likely that contagion through financial centres is a phenomenon limited to emerging market currency crises.
Our analysis of the "wake-up call" hypothesis is based on a number of variables that have been used in the literature to capture institutional similarity between countries. For our main set measures of institutional similarity, we use a number of variables taken from the set of governance indicators compiled by Kaufman et al. (1999) for the World Bank. In particular, we test whether variables such as corruption, regulatory quality, and the degree to which the rule of law is upheld influence whether investors withdraw capital from a country. A disadvantage of this dataset is that data collection 10 See Beck and Levine (2003) for a review 11 Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache. (1998) , Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) , Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) 12 The reporting area countries are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US only began in 1996. However, Kaufmann et al. (2005) note that the quality of governance tends to be highly persistent, institutions change only slowly. 13 Changes in governance over time are small relative to the level of the governance indicators and the reported error margin on the estimates. Changes in annual governance estimates where the 90% confidence intervals do not overlap are only reported in a tiny minority of countries.
14 We therefore take the average score of each country in the years 1996, 1998 and 2000 and used this for each episode of the 1990s currency crises. We then express these variables with respect to the ground zero country. Let c i be the corruption index for country i that is constructed as just described, and let c 0 be the same for the ground zero country. Then the variable that we use in our analysis is defined as:
− . An analogous index of similarity is constructed for the other two institutional variables.
An additional way of capturing institutional similarity derives from legal origin. The large literature on law and finance (e.g. La Porta et al. 1998) argues that a country's legal system (mostly acquired through colonisation or occupation) has important effects on how confidently investors transact in a country, and that this differs significantly between Anglo-Saxon common law and French, German and Scandinavian civil law systems. 15 Motivated by this literature, we complement our core measures of institutional similarity summarized above by an indicator of common legal origin, which takes the value 1 if a country has the same legal system as the ground zero country. The data are taken from La Porta et al. (1998) .
In addition to these variables we use the relative geographical distance to the ground zero country. Countries that are closer are likely to have more similar institutions and culture. Therefore, in the minds of currency speculators, they might be more attractive potential victims in a wave of currency attacks. The distances between countries were computed as the distances between capital cities, using the distance calculator provided by Darrell Kindred 16 at http://www.indo.com/distance.
Finally, we proxy for the overall level of institutional development using GDP/capita. This tends to be highly correlated with indicators of institutional quality.
We use a number of macro-economic variables as "control variables" in the regression, such as current account and budget deficits, countries' reserve positions, credit expansion, inflation and growth performance. These variables control for the possibility that a country would have fallen into crisis regardless of the attack on the first country, because of its own weak macroeconomic fundamentals. 17 In our choice of control variables, we have been guided by the prior work of Eichengreen et al. (1996) , Glick and Rose (1999) and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003) . The variables are computed or taken from the IFS for the period preceding the crisis 18 . This reflects both the delay in data becoming available and the fact that in the 13 http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/GovMatters_IV_main.pdf 14 http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/govmatters3_wber.pdf 15 See Beck et al (2001) for a review 16 This calculator uses the latitudes and longitudes of the cities concerned and then computes the distance between them by using the Geod program, which is part of the PROJ system, a set of cartographic projection tools, provided by the US Geological Survey at ftp://kai.er.usgs.gov/pub/. 17 See e.g. Kaminsky et al (1998) for a review of the empirical currency crises literature 18 1994 for Mexico, 1996 for Asia and 1997 for Russia immediate aftermath of a currency crisis there usually is significant worsening of the macroeconomic situation.
Methodology

Models
Let Z be the n×k matrix that contains all variables that could potentially enter in the regression equation, where n is the number of observations and k is the number of potential regressors. Let )' ,..., ( 1 n y y Y = be an nx1 vector of observed binary variables. We consider all binary probit models that result from including a different subset of Z as explanatory variables, and this gives rise to k 2 models. In particular, model M j is defined as the following probit model:
is an nx1 vector containing unobserved latent data, Z j is a n×k j submatrix of Z, θ is a k×1 vector of unknown parameters, j θ is a k j ×1 subvector of θ containing the elements of θ that are not restricted to be zero in model M j , I n is the identity matrix of dimension n and [.] I is an indicator function which takes value one if the expression in brackets is satisfied and zero otherwise. Note that the elements of θ that are restricted to be zero in model M j (and are therefore not included in j θ ) will be unrestricted in other models.
Our inference for θ is based on the posterior mean and credible regions 19 of the posterior density of θ (
), which is a weighted average of the posterior densities obtained under each of the models (
represents the posterior probability of model M j . To give an intuitive idea of what this posterior probability represents, we note that when the number of observations is sufficiently large, the posterior probability of each model is proportional to the exponential of the Bayesian Information Criterion (Schwarz, 1978) , which is equal to the maximised log-likelihood penalised by the number of parameters in the model. For a precise definition of how the posterior probability of a model is defined, see Koop (2003, p.p. 23-26) .
Let us define the probability of inclusion for a group of explanatory variables S j (possibly containing just one variable) as the joint probability of all models that include at least one of the variables in S j . In other words, the probability of inclusion of S j is the probability that at least one variable in S j has a non zero effect on the expected outcome of the dependent variable. Thus, a zero inclusion probability implies that all of the coefficients in θ that correspond to S j are equal to zero.
The Bayesian methodology presents a number of important advantages over its more commonly used classical counterparts in the context of the contagion literature. Firstly, it allows us to compare simultaneously all possible models. This is in contrast with classical methods, in which only two hypotheses are compared at a time. Secondly, the conditional error rate in significance testing is under control (e.g. Berger and Selke 1987, Selke, Bayarri and Berger, 2001) . To give an illustration of this second advantage and test the robustness of Bayesian methods to prior specification in the context of Probit models, we provide a Monte Carlo experiment in the appendix.
Prior
We propose a prior that is both convenient for performing calculations and that is relatively non-informative. For computational simplicity, we choose a normal prior for the coefficients of model M j :
A prior mean equal to zero implies that we consider outcomes y i =1 and y i =0 to be equally likely a priori for i=1,..,n. This prior mean and prior correlation matrix have been chosen for Bayesian estimation and model selection by many other authors (e.g. Zellner, 1986 , Poirier 1985 , Fernandez Ley and Steel, 2001 ). In the following we discuss prior elicitation for g. We will consider three choices for g, and obtain empirical results for each of them.
We first note that simply choosing a very large value for g would not result in a reasonable prior. Such a large value of g implies that a priori we expect the probability of (y i =1) to be either 1 or zero for every i=1,…,n and consequently marginal effects (on probabilities) to be approximately zero. That is, probabilities between 0 and 1 would receive very small prior weight and marginal effects near zero would receive very high prior weight. 20 Therefore, instead of simply fixing a very large value for g, we adapt for our exercise priors that have been proposed for other related models.
Our first choice of prior fixes a value of g such that:
where j z is a k j ×1 vector containing the average sample values of Z j . This implies the following value of g:
To see why this choice of g is appealing, let us define
, where Ф is the distribution function of a standard normal and therefore π is the probability of (y=1) for a country with average values for the regressors. If we fix g to be equal to g , then our prior for π is a uniform in the interval (0,1). Geisser (1984) argues that, in the context of estimating a probability with a binomial likelihood, a uniform prior has more compelling characteristics than other form of priors 21 .
Another popular choice of non-informative prior to estimate a probability is a Beta distribution with both parameters equal to ½ (i.e. π ~ Beta(1/2,1/2), Lee, 1987, p.241) . This prior, in the context of a binomial likelihood, is non-informative according to alternative criteria used by different authors (Jeffreys, 1961 , Box and Tiao, 1973 , Akaike, 1978 and Bernardo, 1979 . Compared to the uniform prior, the Beta prior gives slightly more weight to values near to zero and near to 1. In our model, this implies that values of θ j that were further away from zero would receive greater prior weight. Within our framework, we can achieve this greater weight by choosing g a g = , with a>1. After experimenting with several values for a, we found that a=2.46 results in a prior for π that approximates well a Beta(1/2,1/2). This is illustrated in Figure 1 , which shows that our prior for π when a=2.46 is virtually undistinguishable from the Beta prior. Therefore, the second prior that we consider results from fixing g g 46 . 2 = . Finally, for sensitivity analysis we will also consider prior (1) with g g 5 = . 
Computation
In order to obtain the posterior probabilities of inclusion, posterior means and credible intervals we use the algorithm proposed by Holmes and Held (2003) , who adapt the algorithm of Albert and Chib (1995) to allow for model uncertainty. The algorithm is a Markov Chain that visits a model at each iteration n (M n ), and also at each iteration generates a value for θ conditioning on M n . Even though the model and value of θ at the initial iteration is chosen arbitrarily, as the number of iterations increases, the models and parameter values generated can be regarded as a sample from the posterior distribution. Therefore, posterior means and other quantities of interest can be easily approximated with their sample analogues. We briefly describe the algorithm here.
Let M n be the model visited in the n th iteration of the Markov Chain algorithm, let θ n be the value of the non-zero parameters in M n at the n th iteration and similarly let * n Y be the value of Y * . Assuming prior (1) for the parameters in a model, and assuming that all possible models have equal prior probabilities, the (n+1) iteration proceeds as follows:
1) Choose a model M * from a uniform distribution defined on the following set of models:
-Model M n -Models that result from dropping one regressor in M n -Models that result from adding one regressor to M n 2) Set M n+1 equal to M * with probability: 
where I n is the identity matrix of dimension n, Z * is a n×k * matrix with the set of regressors contained in M * , k n is the number of regressors in M n and V * and V n are defined as in (1). Set M n+1 equal to M n with probability 1-α. We calculate the posterior probability of model M j as the proportion of iterations that visit model M j . Similarly, posterior means and credible intervals for θ or functions of θ (e.g. marginal effects) can be calculated using the draws obtained with the algorithm.
Results
In Table 1 we list the definitions of the variables that we use. Our main economic results are presented in Tables 2 and 3. Tables 4 and 5 assess the out-of-sample predictive ability of the models. The dependent variable is binary, taking value one if the country concerned suffered a crisis. For each variable we report three quantities. First, we report the probability of inclusion of the variable (p), as defined in Section 4.1. This is the probability that the effect associated with a regressor is different from zero. Second, since Probit coefficients are hard to interpret, we report the posterior mean for the marginal effect of each variable. These marginal effects are evaluated at the sample mean of variables.
22 Third, for each marginal effect, we include the 95% credible interval, as defined in Section 4.1. This is the Bayesian analogue to the classical 95% confidence interval in a Maximum Likelihood estimation. Finally, we report the joint inclusion probability for the institutional similarity variables (R. Law, Reg. Q. and Corrupt) and for the finance variables (Fi1, Fi2 and Fi1*Fi2). Since our goal is to understand whether trade competition, financial links, or institutional similarity drive financial contagion, it is important for us to compare the joint probabilities of inclusion of these different categories of variables. Tables 2 and 3 correspond to the prior with g= g 2. 46 . The results that we comment upon are robust to the 3 choices of g, unless otherwise stated.
The results reported in
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Institutions The main conclusion from our empirical analysis is that institutional similarity is an important predictor of financial contagion during emerging market crises. With our two core priors, the joint probability of inclusion of the institutional similarity variables is at least 95% in all crises episodes with the exception of 1992. When the prior has g = 5 g , the joint probability of institutions in 1998 is still high but decreases to 90%. In 1992 the joint probability is above 80%, which is high but not conclusive. Credible intervals at 95% for the marginal effects of institutional variables almost always exclude positive values, which is consistent with the wake-up call theory: countries that are institutionally similar to the ground zero country are more likely to experience crises. The only exceptions are 95% credible intervals for R. Law and Reg. Q. in 1998, which contain positive values. However, the effects of these two variables in 1998 are more likely to be zero, since their inclusion probabilities are only 27% and 22%, respectively.
Since it is difficult to interpret the size of the marginal effects of the institutional similarity variables, we now provide an alternative way of assessing whether the estimated effects are large or small. Consider a country A that has average value for all regressors except for the institutional similarity variables (R. Law, Reg. Q. and Corrupt), all of which take value 0: that is, this is a country that is very similar to the ground zero country with respect to institutions. In addition, consider a country B that also has average value for all regressors, but whose institutional variables take the same value as the country in our sample that is most dissimilar, in terms of 22 Note that since we have a dummy variable among the regressors, namely Legal Origin, by taking the sample mean of variables we are evaluating the marginal effect at the average intercept. The marginal effect for the dummy variable Legal Origin is calculated as the change in probability when Legal Origin changes from 1 to 0. The marginal effects for the finance variables (Fi1 and Fi2) take into account the consequent change in the interaction variable Fi1*Fi2. 23 Results with the other 2 priors are available from the authors upon request.
institutions, to the ground zero country 24 . Hence, countries A and B are different only with respect to institutions. Then, country A is affected by the crisis in years 1994, 1997, 1998 with probabilities (28%, 63%, 55%), whereas the corresponding probabilities for country B are zero for each year. 25 This confirms that institutional similarity played a particularly important role in the direction of spread of the emerging market crises of 1994, 1997 and 1998. Our results on the effects of common legal origin are less emphatic. Zero values can never be confidently ruled out for the effect of Legal Or in any of the crises, especially in 1992, in which the effect of this variable seems to be negligible. The probability of inclusion of Legal Or. is highest in year 1997, in which positive values can be ruled out, indicating that countries with the same legal system as the ground zero country experienced lower probability of crisis. The 1997 ground zero country has British legal origin, which suggests that overall countries with British legal origin were less susceptible to financial crises, which is consistent with the results of the Law and Finance literature. 26 The opposite effect is observed in years 1994 and 1998, where the ground zero countries have French and (Post-Socialist) civil law legal origins respectively. However, in these years the probability of the effect being zero is even higher.
Finally, the GDP/capita variable, which captures the idea of groups of countries at the same stage of development being attacked, has a low probability of inclusion in all the regressions.
We now turn to the other potential channels for financial contagion. Our results suggest that after controlling for institutional similarity, other variables such as financial linkage, trade competition and distance have limited impact. We provide a detailed discussion in what follows.
Finance
The joint probability of inclusion of finance variables is above 90% only for the 1998 crisis, provided that the prior variance g is equal to g or 2.46 g . This probability decreases to 84% when g = 5 g . Despite the high joint probability, the individual inclusion probabilities of Fi1, Fi2 and Fi1*Fi2 are low. This is probably caused by multicollinearity. Despite of the problem of multicollinearity, it can be observed that the marginal effects of Fi1 and Fi2 in 1998 are positive, since credible intervals exclude negative values. Furthermore, the size of the mean marginal effects is nonnegligible. Although the effect is not as clear for other years, the evidence for 1998 confirms the intuition that the more dependent the country is on the common lender, the more likely that it will be affected by the crisis. 24 The most dissimilar country in our sample is defined as the country that maximises the Euclidean distance with respect to the ground zero country. In terms of the variables that are defined in Table 1 , it maximises (R. Law) 2 + (Reg. Q) 2 + (Corrupt) 2 . According to our data, the most dissimilar countries to the ground zero countries (in terms of institutions) for 1992 (Finland), 1994 (Mexico), 1997 (Thailand) and 1998 (Russia) were Guinea-Bissau, Singapore, New Zealand and Singapore, respectively. 25 For 1992 this probability decreases from 8% to zero. 26 See Beck et al (2001) Trade and Distance The inclusion probability of Trade is highest in the 1997 crisis. It is 94% when g = 5 g , but it is below 90% when g is equal to g or 2.46 g (and it then takes values 81% and 86%, respectively). However, 95% credible intervals indicate that the possibility of negative values can be confidently neglected, and that mean marginal effects are sizeable, indicating therefore that the trade channel of contagion was probably important in 1997. Although zero values are even more likely in 1994 and 1998, 95% credible intervals indicate that moderately large effects are still possible, and negative values are very unlikely. Therefore, Trade could also have been an important determinant in years 1994 and 1998. However, in contrast with Glick and Rose (1999), we find that Trade has a negligible effect in the 1992 crisis. It is Distance, instead, that seems to play an important role. Distance in 1992 is probably simply capturing the fact that EMU countries, which happen to be geographically near, were much more likely to be affected by the crisis. However, the negligible effect of trade is not caused by accounting for distance: if we excluded distance from the set of potential regressors the marginal effect of trade would continue to be small.
Out of Sample Predictions
We evaluate the predictive performance when we use the prior with g= g 2.46 and the following predictive rule, which is defined for several values of p: -y i is predicted to be one when the posterior mean of Pr(y i = 1|Z) is greater than p.
-y i is predicted to be zero when the posterior mean of Pr(y i = 1|Z) is smaller than p.
Predictions are made for (1997, 1998 ) based on parameter estimates from 1994 data. Similarly, predictions are made for (1994, 1998) based on parameters estimated with 1997 data, and for (1994, 1997) based on 1998 data. For each of these three cases we calculate two error rates: E 0 is the proportion of observations that were predicted to be zero but were actually 1. Similarly, E 1 is the proportion of observations that were predicted to be one but were actually 0. Tables 4 and 5 show the results. Table 5 shows that E 0 is equal to 0 when p is 0.05, and it is smaller than 0.1 when p=0.10. This suggests that the model produces reliable predictions of zeros, in the sense that a small posterior mean of Pr(y i = 1|Z) could be taken as strong evidence against the occurrence of a crisis. Table 4 shows that there are few countries for which the posterior probability of a crisis is high, and this introduces a small sample bias in our estimate of E 1 . For example, if 1994 data was used to predict 1997-98 crises, only four cases would have a posterior probability of a crisis greater than 0.90, all of which did actually suffer a crisis: Indonesia in 1997, Republic of Korea in 1997, Malaysia in 1997 and Brazil in 1998. Therefore, the error rate E 1 equals 0, thereby suggesting that predictions of ones are also reliable. However, given the small number of cases that are predicted to be 1, the estimate of this error rate is bound to be imprecise. This is confirmed by the fact that calibration with 1997 or 1998 data yields larger prediction error rates.
Conclusions
We have evaluated several hypotheses on the spread of currency crises. We looked at trade, financial linkages, legal and institutional indicators, geographical distance and included other macroeconomic variables as controls. We used Bayesian model averaging of probit models to obtain estimates and significance tests that are robust to the set of variables that is included in the regression equation. Uncertainty regarding the set of regressors in the regression equation is an inevitable consequence of the existence of numerous hypotheses on the spread of currency crises.
We carefully elicited values for the prior variance that resulted in relatively little information in the prior, while still allowing for simple computations. Simple simulations were also carried out to illustrate that classical tests of significance in probit models often have unacceptable error rates, and that Bayesian methods provide a reliable alternative.
We found that institutional variables played an important role in all currency crises considered, and that similarity to the ground zero country in terms of perceived corruption levels increases the likelihood of contagion in years 1994, 1997 and 1998. Results suggested that trade, distance, legal system and financial indicators might also play a key role on contagion, but their importance depends on the nature of the crisis and sometimes on the specification of the prior. In. GDP GDP per capita at the beginning of the year measured in 1990 US $ in levels (1992, 1997, 1998) and in natural log (1994).
Distance
Distance to ground zero country in miles (1992, 1997 and 1998) and thousand of miles (1994) . Legal Or.
Legal Origin Dummy: 1 if a country has the same legal system as the ground zero country
R. Law
Similarity, to ground zero country, in the degree to which the rule of law is upheld. Decreasing with similarity. Original data from Kaufmann et al. (1999) .
Reg. Q.
Similarity, to ground zero country, in Regulatory quality. Decreasing with similarity. Original data from Kaufmann et al. (1999) .
Corrupt Similarity, to ground zero country, in Levels of Corruption. Decreasing with similarity. Original data from Kaufmann et al. (1999) .
Fi1
The proportion of a country's total borrowing that was borrowed from the common lender.
Fi2
A country's borrowing as a proportion of the total loans made by the common lender.
Fi1*Fi2
The product of Fi1 times Fi2. Table 4 : Out of Sample Predictions of 1. y i is predicted to be one when the posterior mean of Pr(y i = 1|Z) > p. When the models are estimated with 1994 data, predictions are made for (1997, 1998) . Similarly, predictions are made for (1994, 1998) based on 1997 data, and for (1994, 1997 ) based on 1998 data. NP is the number of observations predicted to be 1. E 1 is the proportion of NP that was actually 0. AN is the actual number of ones in the validation sample. Table 5 : Out of Sample Predictions of 0. y i is predicted to be zero when the posterior mean of Pr(y i = 1|Z) < p. When the models are estimated with 1994 data, predictions are made for (1997, 1998) . Similarly, predictions are made for (1994, 1998) based on 1997 data, and for (1994, 1997 ) based on 1998 data. NP is the number of observations predicted to be 0. E 0 is the proportion of NP that was actually 1. AN is the actual number of zeros in the validation sample.
Appendix: Posterior model probabilities versus p-values in Probit models: an illustration with simulated data
In the context of testing whether some parameters in θ are equal to zero, Bayesian methods offer two important advantages over maximum likelihood (ML) methods. Firstly, Bayesian methods allow for the simultaneous evaluation of numerous hypotheses, whereas ML methods typically compare just two hypotheses at a time. That is, in the language of our previous sections, Bayesian methods allow for the simultaneous comparison of more than 2 models. A second but not less important advantage is that in Bayesian testing, unlike in ML testing, the conditional error rate (CER) is under control (e.g. Berger and Selke, 1987) .
In order to define the CER, assume for simplicity that we consider just two models, or equivalently that we want to test H 0 :θ 1 =0 versus H 1 :θ 1 ≠0. Assume that we apply repeatedly a testing procedure to different samples that come from different populations 27 . Some of these samples come from a population with θ 1 =0 and some others from a population with θ 1 ≠0.
When θ 1 ≠0, assume that the values of θ 1 come from a distribution f(θ 1 ). Let p denote the pvalue for a particular sample, if the test is frequentist, or let it represent the posterior probability of H 0 in a Bayesian test. Assume that after the test was applied to each sample, it became known the population from which each sample actually came from. Let R(p) be the set of samples that resulted, approximately, in a given value for p. The CER(p), which is defined for each value of p, is equal to the proportion of samples in R(p) that actually came from a population with θ 1 =0.
To see why we call this an error rate, consider the case of p=0.05, which is commonly used as a threshold value in hypothesis testing. In this case, R(0.05) will consist entirely of samples where the null hypothesis was rejected (at a 5% significance level in the frequentist case), and CER(0.05) captures how many of those samples (as a proportion) were generated from a population where H 0 was actually true. In Bayesian testing, CER(p) is by definition equal to p (i.e. the posterior probability of H 0 ) when the prior density coincides with f(θ 1 ) (Berger and Selke, 1987) . In contrast, however, CER(p) can be substantially larger than p in frequentist tests. Indeed, Berger and Selke (1987) show that in the context of testing the significance of the constant term in a linear model with no other regressors but the constant, the CER(0.05) resulting from a classical test is at least 23% and conclude that a p-value of 0.05 should never be considered as enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis. The main message of this and other related work is that 'p-values are commonly thought to imply 27 Recall that ML procedures are designed to control Type I and Type II error rates, which are defined in the context of repeated sampling from the same population. Type II error rates depend on the true value of θ 1 in the population and the Type I error rate only applies when θ 1 =0.
considerably greater evidence against H 0 than is actually warranted' (Selke, Bayarri and Berger, 2001 ).
As we mentioned, the desired property that the posterior probability of H 0 is equal to values of θ 1 are generated from a distribution with g a =1. 
